a physical state intrinsically identical to the state Mary is in after Mary has seen, but is no longer seeing, red. Conducting a Swamp Mary thought experiment involves assuming that post-experiential Mary knows what it's like to see red and further, retains this knowledge even over stretches of time in which she is no longer having an experience of red. Also involved is an assumption that Swamp Mary has never herself experienced red.
The conclusion urged is that Swamp Mary's physical similarity to post-experience Mary suffices for the relevant phenomenal knowledge despite Swamp Mary's never having had the target phenomenal experience.
Some non-gappy physicalists, e.g. Dennett (2007) and AUTHOR (2009) , hold that the very possibility of deviants like Swamp Mary undermines both qualia antiphysicalism and the Knowledge Argument. In opposition, Alter (2008) argues that deviants are harmless in both cases. The purpose of the current paper is to present a pair of novel arguments to tip the balance in against (certain) qualia anti-physicalists. I will not be targeting all of the possible positions that merit being described as qualia antiphysicalists. I will instead be restricting my focus in ways to be detailed in §2. Also in §2 I make further preliminary remarks concerning the Knowledge Argument and deviant phenomenal knowledge, further setting the stage for the arguments to be developed in § §3-4. I dedicate §3 to what I call the Psychosemantic Argument, the thrust of which is that the targeted qualia anti-physicalists are in a comparatively poor position to accommodate and account for the psychosemantic requirements on deviant phenomenal knowledge, the requirements that must be satisfied in order for putative knowledge states of beings who have not had certain phenomenal experiences to count as representations of the relevant phenomenal facts.
I develop further psychosemantic considerations against qualia anti-physicalism in §4's Factivity Argument, the thrust of which is that if a deviant like Swamp Mary is able to satisfy the psychosemantic requirements on phenomenal knowledge, then the way is cleared for pre-release Mary (non-Swamp Mary) to deduce the relevant phenomenal facts from the physical facts.
§2. Further Preliminaries
A wide variety of possible positions in the philosophy of mind may be described as versions of qualia anti-physicalism. Examples include certain versions of idealism, neutral monism, epiphenomenal dualism, and interactionist dualism. It enhances the tractability of my discussion without diminishing its interest to here restrict attention to a proper subset of the possible qualia anti-physicalist positions. Exposition will also by eased by referring, for now on, to the targeted position simply as "anti-physicalism".
For the purposes of the current discussion, my anti-physicalist target can be picked out as embracing three key theses: (1) the ontological simplicity of qualia, (2) qualia epiphenomenalism, and (3) the soundness of the Knowledge Argument.
The claim of ontological simplicity of interest here is the claim, for at least some qualia, that they are not ontologically dependent on anything else. This is consistent with affirming of some other qualia that they are ontological complexes. For example, it is possible to hold that (a) there is a complex quale associated with seeing something with red and white stripes and (b) this complex is decomposable into component qualia such as a red quale and a white quale. It may be held that the red and white qualia are themselves ontological simples. One kind of view that embraces the simplicity claim would be a dualism that holds that there exist two kinds of irreducible fundamental entities or properties: irreducible physical entities or properties (the basic particles and forces of a completed microphysics) and fundamental phenomenal properties or entities that are not reducible to any physical entities (see, for example, Chalmers 1996, especially pp. 125-126) .
The claim of epiphenomenalism is the claim that qualia lack causal effects. An example of someone who holds such an epiphenomenalism would be a dualist who affirms a causal closure principle for the physical whereby all physical events have physical causes and rejects an over-determination principle thus rejecting the possibility even for prototypical instances of qualia such as phenomenal red. Thus, by falsifying the only plausible explanation of Premise Two, the possibility of deviants renders Premise Two intolerably inexplicable and thus false. Alter (2008) to seeing red would satisfy at least one reading of Alter's requirement but not satisfy mine. The second, and perhaps more important, point worth noting is that it is not directly relevant to the present discussion how many philosophers explicitly embrace the Experience Requirement. Crucial to the deviant-based attack is the claim that the Experience Requirement is the only plausible explanation for Premise Two. This claim is compatible with the claim that the Experience Requirement is seldom explicitly affirmed.
Of course, there might be some way in which Alter's sociological claim is indirectly relevant. Perhaps an argument can be constructed against the deviant-based attack that has as a premise "If the Experience Requirement were the only plausible explanation, more philosophers would have explicitly affirmed it". However, I will not consider this line of thought further.
Argument depends on a claim concerning a way that phenomenal knowledge cannot be learned. As Alter (p. 249) According to Actual Cause, a representation of a red quale need not currently coincide with the instantiation of a red quale. However, the instantiation of a red quale must be one of the antecedent links of a causal chain eventuating in the representation of a red quale. If Actual Cause is to be modeled on the causal theories of reference of Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1981) , then the crucial initial link in the chain may be regarded as a reference-fixing dubbing or "baptismal" event. If Actual Cause is to be modeled on the teleosemantics of Millikan (1984) then the crucial initial link in the chain may be a long-past event in the representer's evolutionary history.
According to Descriptive-isomorphism, the key idea, for the purposes of this paper, is that both representations and representeds are complexes and representation is conceived of as hinging on the structural complexity of both represented and representation. Examples of this sort of semantic approach include the descriptive theory Turning then to Descriptive-isomorphism, we find a third psychosemantic option unavailable to the anti-physicalist. In this case the unavailability is due to something internal to anti-physicalism. In particular, the conflict that arises is between the antiphysicalist doctrine that qualia are ontological simples and the Descriptive-isomorphism requirement that the targets of representation be complexes. A crucial plank of the antiphysicalist platform is that at least some qualia, especially a red quale, are not The last remaining psychosemantic option to consider is Nomological. Is it consistent with the conjunction of anti-physicalism and the possibility of deviants? It will be instructive here to see how far we can go in attempting to adapt Fodor's Asymmetric
Dependence theory to fit with anti-physicalist doctrines. The first obstacle to surmount is that Fodor's theory requires that representeds have causal effects and anti-physicalists are also epiphenomenalists and thus hold qualia to be without effects.
A potential way out for the anti-physicalist/epiphenomenalist seeking to adapt and adopt Asymmetric Dependence is to exploit the anti-physicalist doctrine that even though qualia do not logically supervene on the physical, they nonetheless, in this and nearby worlds at least, nomologically supervene on the physical (Chalmers 1996) . Perhaps, then, (2) 4. If it were not the case that (2) it would still be the case that (1)
Spelling this out just a bit more, suppose the following: Q is a red quale, B 1 is a brain state that Q supervenes on, Z is either a non-red quale or a non-quale, B 2 is Z's supervenience base, and R is a concept of a red quale. The anti-physicalist may suppose that, on many occasions of introspection, the application of R is kaused (with a 'k') by Q meaning that R is caused (with a 'c') by B 1 , the supervenience base of Q. The antiphysicalist may also suppose that introspective error is possible and such occasions of error may be illustrated by R's being kaused (with a 'k') by Z. The adapted Asymmetric
Dependence theory is designed to account for why it is that R's content is Q and not the disjunctive content Q-or-Z.
Prima facie, the adapted Asymmetric Dependence theory that swaps causation-witha-'c' for kausation-with-a-'k' surmounts the difficulty that epiphenomenalism initially posed. However, I think the adaptation contains a much deeper problem: it is unknowable whether any of the four propositions that make up adapted Asymmetric Dependence are ever true. The source of the trouble here is that if epiphenomenal qualia nomologically supervene on anything it's unknowable that this is the case.
I'll say more to substantiate my unknowability charge in just a moment, but I first want to note what appear to be the anti-physicalist's only options in responding to such a charge. The first line of response is to build a case that the requisite laws are knowable after all. The second line of response is to claim that the knowability of the laws is irrelevant. I turn now to briefly sketch some grounds for being pessimistic about the first line of response. Chalmers (1996, p. 215 ) is live to the worry that the kind of anti-physicalism he embraces leads to worries of the unknowability of the posited psychophysical laws. As
Chalmers conceives of the nature of consciousness, it constitutes a domain wherein "rigorous intersubjective testing is impossible" and thus a science of consciousness "will probably always lack the strong empirical credentials of other sciences" (p. 218).
In response to such worries, Chalmers presents a detailed set of considerations, especially in chapters 6 and 7, for why he remains optimistic about the scientific tenability of his "naturalistic dualism". I find the case for optimism uncompelling and will here briefly convey why I remain pessimistic. Chalmers, no doubt, will remain optimistic that some future considerations of theoretical simplicity and plausibility will decide between competing theories underdetermined by the admittedly relatively small set of data. Chalmers writes, of the worry of untestability, that "[t]his worry will only come into play in a strong way if it turns out that there are two equally simple theories, both of which fit the data perfectly, and both of which meet the relevant plausibility constraints" (p. 217). He further states that such a worry about multiple competing theories is premature since we currently lack "even a single theory that can handle the phenomena in a remotely satisfactory way" (p.
218).
My attitude about the relative scarcity of equally adequate epiphenomenalist theories of consciousness is just about the exact opposite of Chalmers's. It strikes me that, given the conceptual toolbox that Chalmers utilizes in arguing against the logical supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical-a toolbox populated by zombies, inverted spectra, dancing and fading qualia, and the like-it ought to be exceedingly easy to construct multiple epiphenomenalistic theories that are equal with respect to empirical and theoretical virtues. I turn now to a quick sketch of how such constructions might proceed.
Let us begin by supposing the following. Suppose that I am currently attending a red quale right now, Q1, and form a concept of that determinate quale. Suppose further that there is a phenomenal determinable whose determinate instances, Q1-Qn, may be ordered with respect to being more or less "faded". I suppose we understand what relative fadedness is insofar as we understand Chalmers's "fading qualia" thought experiments (1996 pp. 253-263) or Hume's suggestion that an idea is a less vivid copy of a sensory impression. Suppose further that the current read-out of my cerebroscope tells me that brain state B is currently co-instantiated with Q1.
All of the suppositions in the previous paragraph are consistent with theory T1, which says, among other things, that it is a law that Q1 is co-instantiated with B. However, these suppositions are also consistent with T2 which differs from T1 only in saying that Q2 is between Mary and Swamp Mary thereby obtains because both are equally incapable of having states descriptive of or appropriately isomorphic to ontological simples.
Let us turn, then, to ask whether Nomological can provide any grounds for the anti-physicalist's claim of a psychosemantic asymmetry between Mary and Swamp
Mary. If such a maneuver is available to the anti-physicalist, then it is going to involve a semantics-supporting nomological relation that obtains between the relevant phenomenal facts and a state of Swamp Mary while at the same time necessarily failing to obtain between the phenomenal facts and every possible (candidate representational) state of (pre-experience) Mary. It's not clear, however, that the anti-physicalist can establish that such an asymmetry must obtain. The question I want to press here is: What is to prevent
Mary from "piggy-backing" on whatever nomological connections relate Swamp Mary's states to the phenomenal facts? And the answer I want to press here is: Nothing prevents
Mary from such "piggy-backing".
The notion of "piggy-backing" at play here may be conveyed by an example. I presume that Nomological lends itself quite naturally to the following account of how scientists are able to think about entities such as electrons and radio-waves that are imperceptible to the unaided senses yet detectable via certain instruments. First, an instrument's detection functions are sustained via nomological relations that obtain between the entities in question and states of the instrument. Second, instrument states are able to be read by the scientist in virtue of nomological relations that obtain between instrument states and states of the scientist's sensory systems. (Of course, if the scientist wears hearing aids or eyeglasses, we need to introduce a third set of nomological relations, but I will ignore such complications for simplicity here.) It is in virtue of the second sort of nomological relations that the scientist is able to "piggy-back" on the first sort and thus secure a semantic grip on the imperceptible.
With that sketch of "piggy-backing" in hand, let's turn to see whether Mary can exploit Swamp Mary the way scientists generally exploit their instruments. The question of whether "piggy-backing" may take place may be phrased in terms of whether the two sorts of nomological relations may obtain, the first being between the distal target and the instrument and the second being between the instrument and the scientist. My second response is that it is quite common for scientists to utilize instruments will have a much easier time dealing with the questions of knowability that arise for the various laws they will need deal with.
My main aim in this paper has been to wield deviants against anti-physicalists.
Although it likely merits the treatment of an entire separate paper, I do want to briefly address the potential relevance of deviants in debates between gappy and non-gappy physicalists. Gappy physicalists, in denying that Mary is a deviant, would incur special psychosemantic burdens if they wanted to also admit that there could be deviants such as Swamp Mary. In past discussions of Mary, at least some gappy physicalists, in particular Descriptive-isomorphism or Nomological. However, such a move incurs the further burden of explaining why pre-release Mary fails to satisfy the psychosemantic requirements on phenomenal knowledge. It is beyond the scope of the current project to argue that the gappy physicalist cannot solve this problem. But I close in noting that it is a problem that the non-gappy physicalist does not have to solve.
